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Abstract
Pascal Engel (2008) has insisted that a number of notable
strategies for rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion are put
forward on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. A central aim
of this paper will be to establish the contrast point: I argue that
one very familiar strategy for defending the knowledge norm of
assertion—viz., that it is claimed to do better in various respects
than its competitors (e.g. the justification and the truth norms)—
relies on a presupposition that is shown to be ultimately under-
motivated. That presupposition is the uniqueness thesis—that
there is a unique epistemic rule for assertion, and that such a rule
will govern assertions uniformly. In particular, the strategy I shall
take here will be to challenge the sufficiency leg of the knowledge
norm in a way that at the same time counts against Williamson’s
(2000) own rationale for the uniqueness thesis. However, rather
than to challenge the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm via the
familiar style of ‘expert opinion’ and, more generally, ‘second-hand
knowledge’ cases (e.g. Lackey (2008)), a strategy that has recently
been called into question by Benton (2014), I’ll instead advance a
very different line of argument against the sufficiency thesis, one
which turns on a phenomenon I call epistemic hypocrisy.
§1
In his excellent paper ‘In What Sense is Knowledge The Norm of As-
sertion?’, Pascal Engel (2008) begins by noting three components that,
taken together, constitute the Knowledge Account of Assertion:
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Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA):
(i) There is a norm for the speech act of assertion
(ii) This norm is unique and constitutive of assertion
(iii) This norm is that one must assert that P only if one
knows that P.
Whilst Engel’s paper does constitute a kind of defence of the KAA,
no where does Engel insist that the KAA is correct; rather, he treads
a more cautious line, which is to identify a variety of lines of criticism
that have emerged against the KAA and to show how these criticisms
are based on different kinds of confusions.
One such confusion has its source in the subtle differences between
different articulations of the knowledge norm in (iii). Following Engel,
let’s call the basic formulation of the knowledge norm ‘KN’:
(KN): One must: assert p only if one knows that p
KN is Williamson’s (1996; 2000) presentation of the norm (and En-
gel’s preferred formulation). But notice that KN is not equivalent to
Moore’s ‘To assert that P is to imply that one knows that P’ nor to
Unger’s ‘To assert that P is to represent oneself as knowing that P1’.
Consequently, as Engel has noted, commentators are missing the mark
when overlooking that challenging these other articulations of the knowl-
edge norm needn’t be successful against the more basic KN.
Another problem Engel locates is the too-common failure to appre-
ciate the sense in which assertion is subject to a norm. In particular, it
is sometimes overlooked that it is perfectly compatible with KAA that
some bona fide assertions violate the norm, and that other norms or di-
mensions of evaluation of assertions come into play2. Engel at this point
makes a number of analogies between assertion and belief. We can be-
lieve on the basis of bad reasons3, but this point seems orthogonal to the
matter of whether belief is subject to a particular norm of correctness
1Cf. Pagin (2006) for a criticism.
2In particular, Engel thinks that such oversights explain why we some are taken
to thinking Jennifer Lackey’s (2007) selfless assertion cases—cases where assertions
are claimed appropriate in the absence of the satisfaction of the belief condition—are
a datum from which it should be concluded that KN and KAA are false.
3As Engel puts it, ‘There is a clear sense in which a belief which is held for reasons
which fall short of being epistemic – for instance a self deceptive belief or one which
we aim to have to secure a form of comfort- still counts as a belief, so why could not
assertions which are made for reasons which fall short of being epistemic, or which
happen to be epistemically weak fail to count as assertions?’
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(e.g. truth). As Engel notes: ‘The fact that the norm can be in many
cases violated, overridden by other norms, or be applied in a very loose
and relaxed way in many conversational circumstances does not show
that the norm is not in place.’
Although I do not think the KN or KAA are correct, I agree with
much of what Engel has to say, and on reflection, this should not be sur-
prising. This is because a major theme in Engel’s work over the years has
been normativism about belief, and in defending this position, Engel has
taken care to show what does and does not count as a legitimate objec-
tion to this view4. Engel’s rationale for defending normativist accounts of
belief strikes me as broadly right, and so I am accordingly sympathetic to
his drawing attention to ways in which KN and KAA have been resisted
for the wrong reasons. In this contribution my aim will be to register
some ways that I think KN and KAA have been accepted for the wrong
reasons, and in the process of doing so, I’ll attempt to motivate—on the
basis of considerations to do with epistemic integrity—some reasons for
rejecting it.
§2
A starting point to this end will be to examine more carefully an idea op-
erating in the background of (ii) in the KAA. Condition (ii), recall, states
that the knowledge norm is unique and constitutive of assertion, as a kind
of speech act. A presupposition of an explicit endorsement of condition
is that there is one unique epistemic rule for assertion, and that such a
rule will govern assertions uniformly5. This is, at any rate, obviously the
assumption in play in mainstream debates about the norm of assertion;
the rules of the game seem to be: some epistemic rule governs assertion;
it’s plausibly either the truth norm (Weiner 2005), the justification norm
(e.g. Douven (2006), Lackey (2007), Kvanvig (2009)), or the knowledge
norm. The philosophical objective is to work out which one is right. One
would think that the ‘uniqueness’ assumption is on safe ground, and that
at the very least there is some (reasonably compelling) positive rationale
4See here, for instance, Engel (2007; 2013). In doing so, he’s taken particular care
to make it apparent how being subject to a norm needn’t involve any positive avowal
to conform to it (which is why desiring to hold false beliefs for pragmatic reasons,
for instance, is not a datum that should lead us to think truth is not the standard of
correctness for belief.) Cf. Shah & Velleman (2005).
5The claim I shall be interested in here is the view that the knowledge norm is
the unique epistemic rule for assertion. This is implied by, but does not imply, the
stronger claim formulated in terms of the rule being constitutive of assertion.
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for proceeding this way6. And even more, given Williamson’s classic de-
fence of this norm in his 1996 paper Knowing and Asserting, one would
have expected that just such an argument for uniqueness would have
come straight from him. Interestingly, as Jessica Brown notes, though
‘Williamson provides no argument for the assumption of uniqueness when
he introduces it7’ (Brown 2008: 97) Williamson’s reasons for accepting
uniqueness are rather indirect.
There might be several rules of assertion. There might be
one . . . Nevertheless, a simple account of assertion would
be theoretically satisfying, if it worked8.” (Williamson 2000:
242).
And because Williamson of course finds the knowledge norm to ‘work’,
he thus takes himself to have reason to prefer a unique norm9. It is im-
portant to be clear here that the kind of support we find from Williamson
for uniqueness does not rationalize the presumption we actually find in
play in the literature—viz., that if one norm is shown to (for instance)
deal with problem cases better than the other two main contenders, then
we should endorse that norm as ‘the’ norm of assertion. This ‘last norm
standing’ approach simply bypasses the matter of whether we should
6For discussion on this point, see also Carter & Gordon (2011).
7My italics.
8I am taking ‘worked’ here to mean: is true, or perhaps, is appropriately defensible.
9I am reading Williamson in this passage as regarding establishing the knowledge
norm to be a task that is theoretically prior to establishing uniqueness–that is, that
establishing uniqueness would be itself be an artefact of establishing the knowledge
norm, and in such a way that evidence against the knowledge norm would be evidence
against uniqueness. While I think this is the right way to understand what Williamson
is saying here, it’s also fair to point out that we can imagine a much wider kind of
rationale for uniqueness, one on which uniqueness (paired with the knowledge norm)
fits naturally within a picture on which knowledge is regarded as playing a range of
theoretically explanatory roles characteristic of the knowledge-first approach. And
so it’s appropriate to evaluate Williamson’s remarks here within a wider context–a
context where knowledge as a unique epistemic rule governing assertion fits within
a wider picture. That being said, reason to think that knowledge is not a unique
epistemic rule governing assertion is at the same time evidence against this wider
picture. The same point can be made were it to turn out that, for instance, Gerken
(2013) is right that no unique epistemic credential warrants practical deliberation.
Thus, while it’s not charitable to suppose that there is not also a wider philosophi-
cal motivation for Williamson’s embracing of uniqueness in play in the background,
this wider philosophical motivation is less compelling if we have reason to doubt the
knowledge norm. Thanks to an anonymous referee at Synthese for requesting further
elaboration on this point.
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be looking for just one norm in the first place. For reasons of simplic-
ity, Williamson is probably right that a unique norm would be ceteris
paribus more theoretically satisfying. But even if the KN can be ar-
gued to do better than weaker norms, such as Weiner’s truth norm and
the Lackey/Douven/Kvanvig justification norm, this falls short of a com-
pelling reason to accept the uniqueness assumption.
§3
Engel and Williamson might point out here that if the KN is not the
unique norm of assertion, it is not because one of the weaker norms is
‘also’ a norm of assertion. Engel quotes Williamson here, in response to
cases of lying and selfless assertion (where assertion would appear proper
despite a lack of knowledge), as remarking that:
Such cases do not show that the knowledge rule is not the
rule of assertion. They merely show that it can be overridden
by other norms not specific to assertion. The other norms do
not give me warrant to assert p, for to have such warrant is
to satisfy the rule of assertion” (Williamson 2000: 256), cited
also in Engel (2004), my italics.
This reply is telling in two ways. Firstly, it suggests a kind of cook-
book recipe for explaining away challenges to KN on the basis of being
‘too strong’ an epistemic norm. The recipe is to locate a non-epistemic
norm satisfied in such cases (e.g. perhaps a Gricean norm) and then to
insist that the apparent propriety of the assertion is a matter of satisfying
that norm, all whilst maintaining that ‘the rule’ would have been satisfied
only were one to have knowledge. Setting aside questionbegging-worries
(vis-a-vis the uniqueness assumption), notice that this reply reveals also
the thought that whatever epistemic norm it is that uniquely governs
assertion, it is one that would be satisfied were one to satisfy ‘the’ rule,
which is knowledge. This is tantamount to an endorsement of knowledge
as a sufficient epistemic credential for ‘whatever the assertion rule is10’.
10An anonymous referee raises the question of whether it would be open for
Williamson to embrace a no epistemic status variation on the sufficiency thesis, in
conjunction the view that knowledge is always necessary for epistemically appropriate
assertion. On this envisioned view, Williamson would be embracing the necessity leg
of the knowledge norm while denying that there is any epistemic status such that
that status is sufficient as an epistemic credential to warrant assertion. While I’ve
argued elsewhere (2011) that that option’s not available to Williamson, I won’t rely
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As I’ve argued elsewhere11, the idea that knowledge is sufficient as
an epistemic credential12 is something that operates in the background
not only in the replies of proponents of KN in response to charges that
the norm is too strong, but also in the thinking of those who endorse
epistemically weaker unique assertion norms13. This is revealed in modus
operandi of asking ‘how much epistemic strength’ is needed to warrant
assertion? Given that knowledge is about as much as one could hope
for, both critics and proponents of the KN and KAA implicitly maintain
that ‘the epistemic rule’ is satisfied if one knows what one asserts14.
on this point here. Rather, I think it’s worth pointing out why I think embracing a
‘no epistemic status’ view (with respect to the sufficiency leg) would be an unprinci-
pled position for any defender of the knowledge norm’s necessity leg, even if the no
epistemic status view were independently plausible. The reasoning here is as follows.
Firstly, unless we want to embrace an error-theory according to which all assertions
are epistemically impermissible, we should accept it as a datum that assertions are
often epistemically permissible. The best explanation for why this datum, along with
the no-epistemic-status view of the sufficiency leg would be jointly true would be epis-
temic norm pluralism, the view that when assertion is epistemically permissible, this
will be in virtue of different epistemic statuses being satisfied in different cases. But
embracing epistemic norm pluralism for the sufficiency leg and the knowledge norm
for the necessity leg is a theoretically unstable pairing. All things equal, we should
expect a pluralist about the sufficiency leg to be a pluralist about the necessity leg.
More weakly, there is additional explanatory burden on one who is a pluralist about
the sufficiency leg while denying pluralism about the necessity leg.
11See Carter & Gordon (2011).
12The term ‘epistemic credential’ is Lackey’s (2012).
13This is not to say that there has not been criticism of the sufficiency thesis. See
fn. 16.
14See, however, Benton (2014) for some resistance to this point. I don’t have the
space to rehearse my previous argument to this effect here, but want to offer two
clarificatory comments. Firstly, I don’t regard a commitment to the necessity leg of
the knowledge norm to entail a commitment to the sufficiency leg. That is too strong:
however, what I’ve suggested before is that a commitment to the sufficiency leg is
clearly implicit in defences of the knowledge account of assertion, where the necessity
leg is primarily what is at issue. I am taking it that if the sufficiency thesis is false,
then this is evidence against the knowledge account of assertion, even if it does not
entail the falsity of the necessity leg of this account. Secondly, the hypocrisy-based
argument I outlined in what follows, here goes through in a qualified way even if this
is false–viz even if we can glean nothing more from evidence against KNA-Suff than
that KNA-Suff is false–as (and as Benton 2014 highlights) whether this sufficiency
leg is true has enjoyed considerable debate recently outwith the wider question of the
knowledge account of assertion, more generally.
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§4
Reason to resist the sufficiency thesis vis-a-vis knowledge is at the same
time reason to doubt that the KN ‘works’. After all, if sufficiency fails,
then sometimes there is a different epistemic rule in play, one not sat-
isfied just by having knowledge. Recall that (a la Williamson) it was
because KN ‘worked’ that we were entitled to think that a unique rule
governs assertion15. If the sufficiency thesis fails, then, there is a kind of
undercutting defeater for the initial reason for Williamons ever offered
for accepting uniqueness in the first place. In short, (i) if uniqueness is
wrong, then so is a popular rationale for accepting KN; and (ii) if the
sufficiency thesis is wrong, then all the worse for ‘uniqueness’.
Why think the sufficiency thesis mistaken? One of the most popular
recent strategies16 for challenging sufficiency appeals to an insight Jen-
nifer Lackey (2012) has termed isolated second-hand knowledge, and in
particular, to rely on cases where expert testimony exhibits the following
feature: an expert plausibly knows some proposition p, asserts p, and
yet that expert’s assertion that p is epistemically criticisable because in
asserting p the expert represents herself has having better than merely
‘second hand’ knowledge.
Consider, as a representative example of such a case, the following,
offered by Lackey (2011, 253):
DOCTOR: Matilda is an oncologist at a teaching hospital
who has been diagnosing and treating various kinds of can-
cers for the past fifteen years. One of her patients, Derek, was
recently referred to her office because he has been experienc-
ing intense abdominal pain for a couple of weeks. Matilda re-
quested an ultrasound and MRI, but the results of the tests
arrived on her day off; consequently, all the relevant data
were reviewed by Nancy, a competent medical student in on-
cology training at her hospital. Being able to confer for only a
very brief period of time prior to Derek’s appointment today,
Nancy communicated to Matilda simply that her diagnosis is
pancreatic cancer, without offering any of the details of the
test results or the reasons underlying her conclusion. Shortly
thereafter, Matilda had her appointment with Derek, where
she truly asserts to him purely on the basis of Nancy’s reli-
15See footnote 8 for elaboration on this point, and some qualification.
16See, for example, along with Lackey (2012, 2014), Coffman (2011), McKinnon
(2012), Gerken (2014), Carter & Gordon (2011). Cf. Benton (2014).
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able testimony, ‘I am very sorry to tell you this, but you have
pancreatic cancer.’ (Lackey 2011, 253)
This case looks initially very problematic for the sufficiency leg of
the knowledge norm. After all, deny that Matilda knows on the basis
of Nancy’s testimony, and we trend toward skepticism. Yet, there is a
strong intuition to regard Matilda’s testimony as in some way epistemi-
cally deficient.
I’ve been among those who have found this style of argument per-
suasive17; in short, what I regarded as the most plausible diagnosis of
DOCTOR is that Matilda, qua expert, lacks a kind of explanatory under-
standing which, in this context, constitutes the appropriate kind of epis-
temic credential to warrant assertion18. This may well be right, though
recent work by Matthew Benton (2014) suggests that intuitions in these
cases could very plausibly rest on a number of confusions. Consider, for
instance, some questions Benton (2014) raises:
. . . do we expect of experts that when speaking as experts
they are giving their own expert opinion which has been
formed by engaging their expertise in a first-hand manner
with the relevant evidence or data? (If we do, is that expec-
tation reasonable?) Do we expect that experts always have
an obligation to explain to a non-expert what is behind the
formation of their opinion? Are there any conditions under
which experts may defer to the authority of other experts for
a second-hand opinion, or a communal consensus, for the pur-
pose of providing timely efficient testimony to non-experts?
Such questions await further investigation.
Benton’s questions strike me as worrying for the strategy against the
sufficiency thesis which I’ve previously pursued. In short, I’m not sure
how to answer these questions, and in light of this, I am less confident
about the evidential weight of this kind of case. To be clear, I don’t
regard a lack of a principled answer on this score to rebut the standard
Lackey-style line that DOCTOR counts against the sufficiency thesis.
Rather, I regard Benton as having posed a kind of undercutting defeater,
at least, for the original line of thinking according to which we move from
intuitions about DOCTOR to the conclusion that the sufficiency thesis is
17Carter & Gordon (2011).
18Cf. Lackey (2013) for a criticism of the view that understanding is what’s lacking
in these cases.
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false. Rather than to try to defeat this undercutting defeater by answer-
ing Benton’s questions and then on the basis of these answers sharpening
how a diagnosis of DOCTOR-style cases should go, I want to try to take
things in a different direction—that is, to challenge sufficiency in a way
that doesn’t rely on DOCTOR or any such cases in the neighbourhood.
§5
Consider now the following pair of cases:
ADOPTION-1: Irene has always wanted a Siberian Husky,
though she realises that adopting one could be dangerous,
given that she has a child in the house. Her friend, Nina,
hears from the Husky adoption agency that a 2-year old fe-
male, “Nymeria,” is safe to be around children, and she tells
this to Irene. Irene adopts Nymeria on Nina’s word. Inciden-
tally, Nina happens to want to adopt a Husky as well, and
is similarly hoping to find one that is safe to be around chil-
dren. Given her epistemic grounds for believing Nymeria is
safe to be around children, Nina would have adopted Nymeria
(but didn’t in this case only because she couldn’t afford the
adoption fee).
ADOPTION-2: Irene has always wanted a Siberian Husky,
though she realises that adopting one could be dangerous,
given that she has a child in the house. Her friend, Nina, hears
from the Husky adoption agency that a 2-year old female,
“Nymeria,” is safe to be around children, and asserts this to
Irene. Irene adopts Nymeria on Nina’s word, taking Nina to
be honest. Incidentally, Nina (who in this case, can afford
the fee) happens to want to adopt a Husky as well, and is
similarly hoping to find one that is safe to be around children.
Although the testimony from the Husky agency was good
enough to epistemically justify Nina’s belief that Nymeria was
safe around kids, it wasn’t (by Nina’s own lights) good enough
for Nina herself to act on—she would only have adopted a
Husky if she had more conclusive evidence that it was safe to
be around children.
I want to now make some initial observations, which I’ll later flesh
out in more detail. Firstly, Nina’s assertion in ADOPTION-2 seems
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criticisable in a way that her assertion in ADOPTION-1 is not. Just as,
in Lackey’s DOCTOR, it’s prima facie plausible to suppose that Derek
rightly expects that Matilda’s testimony has a certain property beyond
just that that it’s something Matilda knows—viz., that she knows it on
the basis of a certain kind of evidence—it’s likewise prima facie plausible
to suppose that Irina expects Nina’s testimony to have a certain property
beyond just that Nina knows it, viz., that if Nina were in Irene’s shoes,
Nina would take what she asserts as a premise in her own practical
reasoning. Were Irene to learn subsequently that Nina would not have
done so—viz., that Nina regarded her own epistemic situation to be good
enough for Irene to act on but not good enough for Nina herself to act
on—Irene will find herself in a position not unlike Derek: her expectation
about an epistemically relevant feature of the assertion will have not been
met.
Lackey uses the term ‘quality’ to refer to something about Matilda’s
assertion which she thinks Derek would rightly regard to be lacking,
despite Matilda’s knowing what she asserts. Specifically, for Lackey,
Matilda’s assertion lacked a certain quality it would have had only if
Matilda had a particular kind of evidence she lacked. In ADOPTION-
2, Nina’s assertion lacked a certain quality it would have had only if
Nina would have also herself been willing to rely on the content of the
assertion.
I want to now sketch out, for illustrative purposes, how a case against
the sufficiency leg of justification account of assertion (JNA-Suff) would
work, drawing from the kind of insight I’ve just alluded to—which I’ll
continue to sharpen—and then I’ll explain why I take the case I pose
against JNA-Suff to be generalisable, as an argument-type, against the
sufficiency leg of the KNA (hereafter, KNA-Suff), and in a way that
(unlike Lackey’s case) does not rely on any intuitions about expert roles
of the kind Benton (2014) found objectionably unclear. This will involve
putting some pieces together.
To generate the conclusion that the JNA-Suff is incorrect, begin by
assuming (for reductio) what the JNA claims: that one is properly epis-
temically positioned to assert p provided one is epistemically justified in
believing that p. Here’s the first premise of the argument:
(1) In ADOPTION-1, Nina’s grounds for her assertion “Nymeria
is safe to be around children,” satisfy the justification norm
of assertion (JNA).
Supposing that the Husky agency is especially reliable in its assess-
ment of dogs’ characters, and that Nina knows this, the testimony she
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receives from the agency representative provides her with excellent ev-
idential grounds for the belief she asserts. Accordingly, it is, to use
Douven’s (2008) terminology, ‘rationally credible19’ to Nina to believe
that Nymeria is safe to be around children; similarly, on Lackey’s (2008)
view, it is reasonable for Nina to believe the proposition she asserts20,
and—by Kvanvig’s (2010)21 lights—Nina’s total perspective recommends
her belief that the Nymeria is safe to be around children. So if JNA-Suff
is right, then Nina’s assertion is epistemically beyond reproach. Now, for
the second premise:
(2) If Nina’s grounds for her assertion “Nymeria is safe to be
around children,” satisfy the JNA in ADOPTION-1, they will
also satisfy the JNA in ADOPTION-2.
The evidential grounds are, after all, exactly the same in the two
cases. Accordingly, JNA-Suff implies that if Nina’s assertion is epistem-
ically permissible in ADOPTION-1, it is also epistemically permissible
in ADOPTION-2. A knee-jerk response here might be to suppose that
this kind of thinking underwriting (2) simply assumes invariantism. But
this is not so; (2) holds even if we are inclined toward something like
justification contextualism, given that the relevant practical stakes for
Nina, in asserting what she does to Irene, are the same across the two
cases, ADOPTION-1 and ADOPTION-222. In both cases, she knows
Irene wants to adopt a non-dangerous Husky and tells her what she does
on evidence that itself does not vary across the two cases.
19According to Douven’s (2008) preferred version of the justification norm, which
he calls the Rational Credibility Norm of Assertion, one is properly epistemically
positioned to assert only what is rationally credible to one.
20On Lackey’s (2007) construal of the justification norm, which she calls the Reason-
able to Believe Norm of Assertion, one is properly epistemically positioned to assert
that p only if (i) it is reasonable to one to believe that p, and (ii) if one asserted that
p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe
that p.
21Kvanvig’s (2010) preferred account of the justification norm makes reference to
one’s total perspective providing one with good reasons or justification for p.
22I don’t want to suggest that this premise holds for all varieties of context sensi-
tivity, just standard ones. For example, a relativist (e.g. MacFarlane 2005, 2014)
would have comparably more scope to resist (2). However, even if justification
were assessment-sensitive along the model MacFarlane develops in defending a truth-
relative semantics for ‘knows’, it’s not obvious that relativists would be inclined to
deny (2). After all, if the case-pair is evaluated relative to the same context of assess-
ment, we can easily envision the relativist agreeing with (2).
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Of course, the premise doing the heavy lifting, and which I’ll motivate
in more detail in the next section, in generating the result that we should
reject the sufficiency leg of the JNA is (3):
(3) In ADOPTION-2, Nina’s assertion is epistemically criti-
cisable (e.g. it does not pass scrutiny from an epistemic point
of view)
which, with (1) and (2), along with the definition of JNA-Suff, implies:
(4) Therefore, the sufficiency leg of JNA is false (from JNA-
Suff, 1,2,3).
In defending (3), what I want to contend—and defend further in the
next section—is that, in ADOPTION-2, (unlike in ADOPTION-1) Nina’s
assertion is in fact epistemically criticisable; holding fixed the practical
facts of the context of her assertion, the assertion would have been epis-
temically permissible only if she had better epistemic grounds than she
did when asserting C.23 More specifically, what I shall suggest is that
in ADOPTION-2, if Nina had better epistemic grounds than she did—
indeed, grounds good enough that she would have acted on them—this
would vitiate (completely) any intuitive basis for criticising the asser-
tion; the assertion would have been as unproblematic as the assertion
in ADOPTION-1. And an explanation I shall outline on this score ul-
timately reveals a recipe for challenging a more secure view than the
sufficiency leg of the justification norm, viz., the sufficiency leg of the
knowledge norm.
23If (simply) an improvement in one’s epistemic grounds is all that would be needed
to separate a defective assertion from a permissible assertion, then it’s plausible to
think this assertion is epistemically criticisable, rather than criticisable in some other
way. After all, it’s specifically the epistemic grounds that make the difference. Also,
as a point of clarification: it would be a mistake to think that Nina, in ADOPTION-
2, is merely violating some sort of pragmatic, Gricean norm, according to which one
‘shouldn’t assert hypocritically’ even while passing scrutiny from an epistemic point
of view. Firstly, the account of epistemic defectiveness just proposed (i.e. that an
assertion is epistemically criticisable if all that separates it from being permissible is
need for improved epistemic grounds) implies that Nina’s assertion is epistemically
defective even if it violates some other Gricean norm prohibiting hypocrisy; the two
needn’t be mutually exclusive. Secondly, a Gricean norm according to which asser-
tions shouldn’t be hypocritical would more plausibly be construed as a non-epistemic
norm that is violated only when one’s explicitly asserted prescription or evaluation
involves a double-standard.
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§6
Again, using JNA as a toy example before we resituate the point with
respect to KNA: that Nina’s assertion seems epistemically criticisable
in the former, but not the latter case, would be inexplicable on the as-
sumption that JNA-Suff is true; Nina satisfies the justification norm in
ADOPTION-2 no less than she does in ADOPTION-1. JNA-Suff pre-
dicts the assertions will be equally epistemically permissible. Accord-
ingly, then, an account of epistemic impropriety in ADOPTION-2—and
hence a defence of premise (3) against the JNA-Suff—will involve (as a
premise) some commitment to a different kind of epistemic norm than
JNA. But what would it be?
I think we can make some inroads here by contrasting two notions:
epistemic hypocrisy and epistemic integrity. Define epistemic hypocrisy
as follows:
Epistemic hypocrisy : An assertor A’s assertion p exhibits
epistemic hypocrisy if (i) A asserts p to B; (ii) A wouldn’t
use p as a premise in A’s own practical deliberation; (iii) A
expects B to rely on what A asserts in B’s practical deliber-
ation; and (iv) A would use p in A’s practical deliberations
only were A’s epistemic support for p better than it is when
A asserts p to B.
Discovering that you are the recipient of epistemically hypocritical
testimony from an asserter is much like learning that the accountant
that someone has recommended to you is not one that that individual
trusts enough to use herself. Upon finding out (say, by hacking into
your accountant-recommender’s e-mail) that the recommender did not
have enough confidence in the competency of the accountant she’s just
recommended to you to use, to rely on herself, you will be right to be
miffed. An entirely reasonable expectation about a certain quality of
the assertion has not been met. That the criticisability of the assertion
is epistemic, not merely practical, can be supported with reference to
the point that your interlocutor would have relied on the accountant she
just recommended to you, only were your interlocutor to have had better
epistemic grounds to regard her as trustworthy.
The expectation that was not met in the case of the recommendation
of the accountant was a certain kind of epistemic integrity, a quality your
‘friend”s testimony lacked, regardless of whether, say, your friend knew
the accountant was reliable. You immediately withdraw your criticism,
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of course, if you learn that the e-mail contained a typo, and that your
friend was in fact willing to use the accountant she just recommended to
you on the basis of the epistemic support she had in recommending that
accountant to you. The ‘antidote’ to epistemic hypocrisy is epistemic
integrity.
Epistemic integrity (as well as epistemic hypocrisy, as exhibited by
Nina in the latter case) is a function not only of the epistemic grounds
one has simpliciter, but also of the grounds one has relative to one’s
disposition to act on these same grounds. We can make sense of the
epistemic impropriety of Nina’s assertion once we recognise (contrary to
what is assumed by the orthodox norms on offer) that the propriety of
her assertion is subject to a distinctively social-epistemic dimension of
epistemic evaluation, a dimension of evaluation that looks beyond just
what the individual’s grounds are for the assertion she has. A norm the
satisfaction of which will not be fixed just by facts about the epistemic
standing occupied by the asserter, but also only once relational facts
about that epistemic standing are fixed, is:
Epistemic Integrity Norm (EIN): One must: assert p only
if one accepts p on the basis of epistemic grounds on which
one would act; or, alternatively: one must: assert p only if
one accepts p on the basis of epistemic grounds on which one
would take p as a premise in S’s practical reasoning.
If EIN (or something near enough to it) is right, we can easily derive
an explanation for the epistemic impropriety of Nina’s assertion, so long
as we are willing to take on board a plausible principle about the func-
tion of assertion, which, as Jessica Brown (2012) puts it, is that one of
the distinctive functions of assertion is to entitle hearers to rely on the
asserted proposition in their practical deliberations (e.g. Brandom 1983;
Milne 2009). Call this (as she does) the licensing view of the function of
assertion24.
EIN, supplemented with the licensing view of the function of asser-
tion, generates a neat explanation for why Nina’s assertion in ADOPTION-
2 is epistemically impermissible, even though permissible in ADOPTION-
1, and all this even though the epistemic grounds Nina has (assessed in-
dependently of their connection to Nina’s disposition to act) do not vary
24As Brandom (1983: 640) puts the idea: “The asserted sentence warrants the
audience to assert just those sentences which may appropriately be inferred from the
original claim.” Cf. Brown (2012: 145) for a more detailed discussion of the licensing
view, and its connection to epistemic norms of assertion.
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across these cases. And so the argument against JNA goes through25.
Before examining the EIN more closely (and defending it a poten-
tial line of objection), I want to show why the epistemic impropriety in
ADOPTION-2 can’t be accounted for by the knowledge account of as-
sertion. In short, this is because argument I’ve sketched against JNA
generalises to show the inadequacy of the knowledge norm, via its suffi-
ciency leg. Here’s the generalisation recipe26:
(i) Construct a variant of the ADOPTION pair of cases but
where the epistemic grounds in Case 1 and 2 are stronger than
they are in ADOPTION, strong enough so as to plausibly
qualify as knowledge, though not maximally strong in order
to leave room for a potential improvement in one’s epistemic
position vis-a-vis the target proposition.27
(ii) In Case 1, S asserts p on the basis of his knowledge that
p, and would (in the relevant counterfactual situations) act
on p (or, alternatively, take p as a premise in S’s practical
reasoning). Build Case 2 to mirror Case 1, and so in Case 2,
S knows that p, but in Case 2, S is not disposed to act on p,
and would be disposed to do so only if S’s epistemic grounds
were comparatively stronger.28
25I want to briefly comment on the connection between EIN and a related epistemic
norm that has been defended by Jim Stone (2007) and which also links epistemically
appropriate assertion with action. On Stone’s account, S is entitled to assert p when
S believes p on the basis of evidence that makes believing p reasonable, so much so
that, under the circumstances, it’s reasonable to act on p. (Stone 2008: 19). I think
Stone’s account has merits that the traditional norms lack, but unlike EIN, Stone’s
account is going to fall in step with the knowledge, justification and truth norms in
counting epistemically hypocritical assertions as free from epistemic scrutiny. After
all, one might not actually be disposed to act on the epistemic grounds one has even
if it would be reasonable (given these grounds) for her to do so.
26It should be clear how the same cookbook recipe can be generated against the
truth norm.
27This should be unobjectionable to epistemologists who accept even weak versions
of fallibilism.
28Even for philosophers who reject fallibilism, the argument I’ve adduced here
against the KNA should go through. This is because all that is needed to generate a
case where one satisfies the KNA but nonetheless asserts in a way that is epistemi-
cally criticisable is for one to be unwilling to act on one’s epistemic grounds because
she doesn’t take them to be sufficient to warrant (her own) action. So long as she
wouldn’t act on her knowledge (in part because she judges her epistemic grounds to
be epistemically inadequate), and yet asserts her item of knowledge which she believes
to be unactionable for her, her assertion counts as epistemically defective (by EIN)
even though satisfying the KNA.
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(iii) Point out that the impropriety in Case 2 is epistemic
(after all, in Case 2, the assertion would have been permissible
were the epistemic grounds strong enough that S would act on
them) and that it can’t be explained by appeal to the KNA,
which S satisfies in both Case 1 and Case 229.
§7
Question: do I want to say that EIN simply is the unique epistemic norm
of assertion, and hence, assertion passes scrutiny from an epistemic point
of view just in case it passes scrutiny from the kind of social-epistemic
perspective of evaluation captured by EIN? Answer : no.
The very feature of the EIN which makes it sensitive to epistemically
criticisable epistemic hypocrisy (by way of its sensitivity to the grounds
one would act on) is a feature that appears to open it up to counterex-
ample, in so far as EIN is construed as the epistemic norm for assertion.
Consider the following case:
JOE SIX PACK: Joe Six Pack and his friend, Lionel, are go-
ing to a party, where Joe informs him that there will be a
keg-stand competition. Lionel seems reticent to participate;
29It will be helpful here to comment on the relationship between EIN and the
knowledge action norm, as defended by among others Hawthorne (2004), Fantl &
McGrath (2002) and Hawthorne & Stanley (2008). As Hawthorne (2004, 30) puts the
idea: ‘...it is acceptable to use the premise that p in one’s [practical] deliberations if one
knows it and . . . unacceptable to use the premise that p in one’s practical reasoning if
one doesn’t know it.’ Given that the EIN, in an obvious respect, makes action relevant
to whether one counts as satisfying a plausible epistemic norm on assertion, and given
that the knowledge action norm directly connects action and knowledge, one might
wonder whether a proponent of a knowledge action norm gets something like EIN for
free. There are two reasons why this is not so. Firstly, something like Cappelen’s
(2011) ‘no assertion’ view remains a theoretical possibility for one who embraces a
knowledge action norm; that is, one might accept Hawthorne’s claim in the quoted
passage while following Cappelen and denying that it is, as he puts it, ‘theoretically
useful to single out a subset of sayings as assertions.’ Given this theoretical possibility,
it’s a mistake to think that EIN, or more generally any particular epistemic norm
governing assertion, is entailed by a knowledge account of action. Even more though,
it’s not clear that, for one who does opt for some epistemic norm governing assertion,
that embracing the knowledge action norm obviously recommends EIN, a result which
further suggests the views are theoretically orthogonal. The Joe Six Pack case, for
example, is one that satisfies the EIN but which violates the knowledge-action norm.
Thanks to an anonymous referee at Synthese for requesting further discussion on this
point.
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he mentions to Joe that he has been prescribed anticoagu-
lants for his blood clots and is currently taking Warfarin30.
Jovially, Joe tells Lionel that his grandfather takes Warfarin
and drinks all the time; he asserts: “It’s perfectly safe to drink
alcohol and take Warfarin--if I had blood clots and were on
Warfarin, I’d drink.”
Joe’s assertion is epistemically criticisable, even though Joe satisfies
EIN. Is this a problem for EIN? It certainly would be, if the uniqueness
thesis were antecedently established. But the very cases that motivate a
need for EIN, over and above either the justification or knowledge norms,
count against the original basis Williamson offers us for accepting unique-
ness in the first place. Where does that leave us? I think that where that
leaves us is a spot where we should be more prepared to think that the
epistemic rule governing assertion will not always be uniform. (This is
tantamount to thinking outside the box of the uniqueness assumption).
Recent work by Gerken (2013) has moved in this direction, and in par-
ticular, in the direction of supposing different epistemic rules will be in
play in different contexts31. This is messier than Williamson wanted—
uniqueness is much cleaner—and it would be preferable, and at minimum
more elegant, if one unique norm ‘worked.’ But to the extent that epis-
temically hypocritical assertions are as I’ve suggested here epistemically
defective ones, it’s hard to see just how one would, the knowledge norm,
or otherwise32
30Warfarin thins the blood, which prevents its ability to clot. Significant alcohol
consumption enhances Warfarin’s effect.
31Cf. Turri (2014) who suggests that the uniqueness assumption may be rejected in
favour of what he calls a pluralist axiological knowledge account of assertion (which
is nevertheless, a knowledge norm of assertion). I am directing the challenge for
sufficiency, as developed here, against what Turri himself rejects under the description
of the simple version of the knowledge norm (2014, 558), which is also the standard
way of thinking of the knowledge norm. I’ll remain agnostic for the present purposes
whether epistemic hypocrisy cases can support counterexamples to the more complex
pluralist axiological knowledge account of assertion Turri defends. Thanks to an
anonymous referee at Synthese for raising this point.
32It is a great pleasure to contribute to Pascal Engel’s Festschrift on the occasion
of his 60th birthday. One particular topic I’ve had the opportunity to discuss with
him in some detail is assertion, and in particular, assertoric norms, and so naturally,
this is a topic I thought would be most fitting to explore here. Thanks also to Julien
Dutant, Davide Fassio and Anne Meylan and two anonymous referees at Synthese,
and also to Emma C. Gordon for helpful conversation. An ancestor paper to this
one–‘Engel on Knowledge Account of Assertion’–appeared in Liber Amicorum Pascal
Engel, eds. J. Dutant, D. Fassio & A. Meylan, University of Geneva, 158-168.
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